Several studies and media sources often report a labour shortage in the nursing profession. Given this shortage, one might assume that registered nurses (RNs) would have a perspective of maximizing wage income: increase the hourly wage or the number of hours worked. Institutional incentives in place can influence these two components, particularly the hourly wage. However, previous studies of Canadian nurse wages were limited to individual factors and did not take into account contextual factors such as hospital market share, labour market size or unionization. Based on market share, some refer to the nursing labour market as a monopsony; which depresses wages and might explain the shortage. However, this has not yet been tested empirically in the Canadian RN labour market. This article aims to fill this gap by using the confidential microdata files of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2010 to 2012 and the multi-level analysis to shed light on this issue. The contribution of this work is that it takes into account both individual and contextual variables to try to explain nurses' hourly wage. In accordance with the monopsony model, we hypothesize a negative correlation between hourly wage and level of market share; i.e. monopsony employers would pay a lower wage rate. The results do not support the monopsony model to explain nursing labour shortage: there is no statistically significant relation between RNs wages and market share; no relation was found for market size either. This suggests explanation for RN labour shortage must be investigated elsewhere.
I. Introduction
It is generally established that there is a shortage of nurses in Canadian labour market. Given this shortage, nurses who wish to maximize their income may choose to work more hours, negotiate a higher hourly rate or even operate both levers simultaneously. However, existing studies show that they didn't have a higher work intensity (i.e. they didn't work higher number of weekly hours) 1 than similar workers in other sectors of the economy (Laberge and Montmarquette, 2009 ). This implies that the revenue maximization objective may be pursued by seeking higher pay rates. With a high unionization rate, such a strategy is plausible. Indeed, the nursing sector exhibits a high union density. RNs who were either unionized or covered by a collective agreement between 2010 and 2012 represented 81.0 % in Canada (Uppal, 2011) . It is generally accepted that, all things being equal, unionized workers generally earn more than non-unionized ones. However, the literature also suggests that nurses face a labour market characterized by monopsony (or oligopsony): i.e. they offer their labour at a single hospital (or a few hospitals) in a given region. In such a context, these hospitals may offer a lower wage than what we would have seen in a competitive market (i.e. if there were a large number of hospitals in a given region). The stakes are between the unions which target higher hourly wages for their members and the employers who seek to pay lower wage rates. These low wages on the one hand, do not encourage nurses to work more, and on the other hand, induce employers to demand for more work hours, which ultimately would fuel the nursing shortage.
1 The labour intensity is reduced to the number of worked hours. But it could be defined as a more complex concept that also includes workload; for example the ratio number of patients per nurse.
There is a relatively large literature on the effect of monopsony power on wages in the nursing labour market. Previous studies that have examined such relationship include: Hurd (1973); Link and Landon (1975) ; Sloan and Elnicki (1978) ; Feldman and Scheffler (1982) ; Adamache and Sloan (1982) ; Bruggink et al. (1985) ; Schumacher (1995, 2005) . Among these studies, most of the earlier ones find a positive relationship between wages and the degree of hospital competition, as predicted by the monopsony theory. Exceptions are found in Adamache and Sloan (1982) and Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) . A relatively recent study has confirmed these exceptions and found no evidence of monopsony power in RN labour market (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2005) . These authors found in their 2005 study that there is some evidence among women that wages are lower in markets with lower worker mobility, but not for RNs.
Despite the importance of the nursing imbalance issue in Canada, few studies have been undertaken on Canadian nurses' wage. Those available, consider only individual factors such as education level, seniority, leaving aside institutional factors such as the degree of hospital competition and nurse unionization (Vujicic 2003; Buhr, 2006) . This study intends to fill part of this gap; especially with respect to the institutional factors that can help to understand nurses'
wage. The contribution of this work is the inclusion of both individual and institutional variables in a multi-level analysis to understand the effect of monopsony on nurses' wage in Canada.
Previous Canadian studies did not explicitly consider hospital competition and nurse unionization. Schumacher (1995, 2005) accounted for variables at both levels in their studies on wages' nurses for the United States. As contextual or institutional level variable, they included the degree of hospital competition in their model, but they use two stages estimation procedure; which can compromise the analysis and interpretation of variables. Multilevel method prevents the analysis and interpretation of variables at non-appropriate levels (Hox and Roberts, 2011 ).
This paper tries to answer the general research question: What is the impact of individual and institutional factors on the hourly wage of nurses working in Canadian hospitals?
We start from the main assumption that monopsony or oligopsony exists on the nursing labour market in
Canada, but the presence of unionism could eventually offsets this force.
Two specific hypotheses derive from the monopsony assumption. Ceteris paribus:
1. There is a negative relationship between hourly wages and hospital market share 2. There is a positive relationship between hourly wages and market size
The specific hypothesis from the offsetting union effect is that:
3. Unionized nurses earned more than their non-unionized counterparts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents an overview of the theoretical monopsony model. In the third section, data sources, operationalization of the concepts and some descriptive statistics are discussed. The empirical model is outlined in the fourth section while section 5 presents the results. In section 6, a general discussion is offered along with study limitations. Finally, a conclusion is provided in Section 7.
II. The theoretical monopsony model

Monopsony nurse labor market with union coverage
Pioneer theoretical studies that discuss monopsony/monopoly market in general include Robinson (1933) , Archibald (1954) . For nurse labour market specifically, Yett (1970) ; Link and Landon (1975) ; Sullivan (1989) were among the first authors who addressed monopsony with or without union coverage. Without union coverage, a strong monopsonist will hire nurses to the point where the marginal factor costs (MFC) equal the marginal revenue product (MRP), but will pay only wage W m . At this wage, he will get level of employment E m , but would be willing to hire Ē m nurses (an additional number given by the dash-dot line). This results in underemployment and the monopsonist will report vacancies E m Ē m at wage W m (see Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: Monopsony nurse labor market with union coverage
Source: Link and Landon (1975) Note that the supply curve for nurses is kinked. Wage increases will be met, but wage decreases will result in a substantial loss of nurses to the wage cutter. With union coverage, resulting employment and wage levels, however, depend on the union's goals. A strong union vis-a-vis the monopsonist / oligopsonist can treat the MRP curve as the demand for the services of its members. In fact, the union may be strong enough to dictate the wages of its members on a takeit-or-leave-it basis. That wage can vary between W m and W s without decreasing employment levels. If the union chooses to maximize the wages of the current membership, it will set wages at W s . Maximization of employment as a goal will result in the hiring of E c nurses at the wage W c ; which is the equivalent outcome of a competitive market. The weaker the union versus the oligopsonist, the closer the wage will approach W m (i.e., the oligopsony-nonunion case). If a strong union attempts to whipsaw the individual oligopsonists, the hospitals may collude to form an organization to bargain with the union. This would be the case of a classical bilateral monopoly. The Canadian nurse labour market is perceived as a bilateral monopoly. Whether or not vacancies will be reported depends on the ability of the union to maintain the wage at or above W c . It is expected that the coefficient for the monopsony variable to be negative: a high level of monopsony will produce a low hourly wage for RNs. On the contrary, a positive correlation is expected for the union variable: a high level of unionisation will lead to higher nurse hourly wage.
Other factors that explain hourly wages
The above mentioned variables are at the institutional level. It is also necessary to introduce variables at the individual level in order to be able to explain RN wage differences within a region. These individual level variables include: level of education, number of years of experience, tenure, employment status (full time versus part-time), family status. As per the human capital theory (Becker, 1964) , it is expected that the coefficients associated with education level and years of experience to be positive: hourly wages should increase with the level of education and the number of years of experience. , tenure and union coverage (among the γ 10 ) should be positive:, with tenure and with the fact of being covered by a union. Moreover, wages are expected to be higher in Alberta and lower in Quebec relative to Ontario. 
III. Data
Data Sources
Defining the concepts and variables
Some variables and concepts need to be defined to avoid confusion. This is the case for RN hourly wage. In the LFS, salaries or wages may be declared on an hourly, weekly, monthly or annual basis. They relate to the main job and include tips and commissions, before taxes and other deductions, but they usually do not include benefits. 7 Hourly and / or weekly wages 8 are calculated together with the weekly working hours usually paid. This means they do not include overtime. All RN hourly wages less than $5 or greater than $150 were excluded from the sample.
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Education level is a binary variable with 1 for RNs with a community college, CEGEP or university certificate below Bachelor's degree and 2 for RNs with a Bachelor's degree.
The variable years of experience does not exist as such in the LFS. This is a theoretical variable measured by subtracting the age from the number of years of schooling and adding 6 years (the age of starting school). This is a variable that is correlated with age. It is different from tenure which refers only to the current job.
Employment status includes full-time and part-time employment. The latter consists of persons who usually work less than 30 hours per week at their main job or their only job.
Family status is a categorical variable derived from the combination of marital status and presence of one young kid or not. 10 It ranges from 1 to 4 with: 1 = being married or in a common-law relationship with young kid; 2 = being married or in a common-law relationship without young kid; 3 = not being married nor in a common-law relationship with young kid; 4 = not being married nor in a common-law relationship without young kid.
The Herfindahl index (HI) is commonly used in the literature as an indicator of hospital market share or level of competition (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2005; Link and Landon, 1975) . It is calculated from the number of beds by summing the squares of each hospital's market share of the total market. Therefore, it is defined as: HI j =∑ j p i 2 where j indexes the geographic region, i the hospital and p the hospital market share (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2005) . It ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 0 indicating a high degree of competition (several hospitals share more or less equally the available beds in the market) and values close to 1 indicating a high degree of 10 Young kid is defined as a child between ages 0 to 14 years old.
oligopsony (the beds are disproportionally controlled by a small number of hospitals). This HI reflects both the number and size of hospitals. Specifically, we followed the typology of markets established by the US government, based on the value of the HI: The size of the RN sample by degree of hospital market share matters because it is a key variable in our analysis. 38.3% of RN in our sample works in regions where the level of hospital market share is low (high competition) while 45.1% works in regions where the level of hospital market share is high (low competition).
Union status is defined as: a) unionized; b) non-unionized but covered by a collective agreement or an employment contract negotiated by a union; or c) non-unionized and not covered by a collective agreement. In this study, the unionization rate is the percentage of employees who are union members or covered by a collective agreement. This excludes the self-employed.
The region in this work refers to the employment insurance region (EIR). There are three types of regions in the LFS: 1) Economic Regions, 2) Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) / Urban Areas / Census Agglomerations (UA / CA) and 3) EIR. 11 We chose to use EIR because they are generally better distributed and better disaggregated within a province 12 and our study examines the labour market. EIR are distributed as follows: 12 in Quebec; 16 in Ontario; 4 in Alberta; 6 in BC and 16 in the rest of Canada, for a total of 54 regions. The hospitals were located in a given EIR based on their postal code using the interactive application of Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) that matches postal codes to EIR.
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Market size refers to the number of working age people in a given region. It permits to regroup peer-regions that are likely to have the same characteristics. Based on Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) , 14 we identified six market sizes; which permits us to regroup the 54 EIR into six peergroups: Half (27 of 54) of EIR are found in peer-regions 1 and 2 where the size of the population is less than 300,000. Obviously EIR Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver belong to the last peer-region.
EIR Central Ontario, Calgary and Edmonton are part of the peer-region 5. The directory of the municipalities for a given EIR may be found using the interactive application of ESDC. 
Descriptive Statistics
We provide a descriptive overview of the RN hourly wage prior to our formal analysis. Table 3 presents the mean wage rates and standard deviation ( Prairies. Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia (BC) are kept as stand-alone. These four provinces account for 86% of the total population of Canada. This provincial structure results in six "derived" provinces. It should be reminded that these wage rates do not include benefits and overtime. Mean wage rates and standard deviation are presented for two job characteristics (union status and employment status) in the first part of Table 3 . 28.3 (6.0) 35.1 (8.4) n/a n/a 34.6 (7.6) 33.2 (8.0) 4 : 500,000 to 999,999 n/a 28.7 (5.9) 34.9 (7.8) 34.2 (6.6) 36.1 (7.4) 34.1 (6.9) 33.6 (7.5) 5: 1M to < 2M n/a n/a 35.7 (7.6) 37.0 (7.2) 37.2 (8.1) n/a 36.6 (7.9) 6: 2M to 5M n/a 28.3 (8.9) 36.0 (9.2) n/a n/a 34.6 (7.7)
33.3 (9.4) All Market Sizes 32.2 (6.6) 28.6 (7.7)
35.5 (8.5) 35.5 (7.4) 37.4 (7.6) 34.5 (7.3) 34.0 (8.3) n/a: not applicable.
At the Canada level, RNs with a bachelor degree were paid 1.8% more than those who have a college degree or CEGEP. The province where the difference matters more is Quebec (14.7%).
However, provinces like Ontario, MB & SK, and BC experimented the reverse. This could be due to the fact that those RNs with a college degree in these provinces have more years of experience or tenure than those with a bachelor degree; which highlights the importance to control for other factors. Moreover, at the Canada level, hourly wage for full-time RNs was lower than that for part-time RNs (-3.7%). This was also the case in the comparing provinces:
wage gap of full-time RNs compared to part-time RNs was -3.3% in AC, -4.7% in Quebec, -4.1% in Ontario, -1.4% in MB & SK, -1.1% in Alberta, -2.8% in BC.
Besides, at the national level, unionized RN were paid 10.6% more than those who are not unionized. This was also the case for RNs in the comparing provinces. Wage differences between unionized and non-unionized RN were the lowest in Quebec (9.1%) and the highest in BC (24.3%).
It is important to distinguish between market share which refers to the level of competition within a region (as measured by the relative number of beds in a hospital) and market size which refers to the size of the workforce in a specific region. Market size is not directly correlated with the HI. However, it is expected that, in less populated areas, fewer hospitals exist, and consequently have higher market share. 18 The second part of table 3 presents the mean wage rates and standard deviation (in brackets) for RNs by market characteristics: market share and market size.
At the Canada level there seems to be a positive gradient between market share and hourly wage.
Although this univariate result of higher wages in concentrated markets (high market share)
provides evidence that superficially rejects the monopsony model, it is not compelling evidence because we need to control for other factors. Moreover, there is not a clear gradient for a number of provinces. 18 Where market share data is not available, some use market size as a proxy.
There is not a clear gradient between market size and hourly wage. At the Canada level, there was rather a zigzag pattern with hourly wage tending to be higher in regions of size 5 and lower in regions of size 3, 4 and 6. However, the trend was slightly downwards, suggesting that hourly wage tends to decrease as market size increases; which would be superficial evidence against the monopsony model. The wage difference between the regions with the highest and lowest hourly wage was 10.2%.
At the provincial level, RNs in Quebec generally earned less than those in the other provinces.
Those in Alberta earned more. There was a wage difference of about 7.0% between regions with the highest and lowest hourly wage in Quebec as well as in Ontario. This wage difference between regions was the lowest in Atlantic Canada (3.2%).
IV. Empirical Model
The dependent variable is RN hourly wage while the independent variables are the individual characteristics (education, years of experience, tenure, employment status, family status) and the regional/institutional characteristics (market share, market size). Province and union coverage were also included as independent variables. The choice of the individual variables is largely justified by the human capital theory (Becker, 1964) . For the contextual variables, note that in the Canadian context, hospitals do not negotiate directly with nurses nor with the unions.
Negotiations are directly between the government and unions. One would assume that the Herfindahl index is not relevant in this context. However, it is still matters since there can be targeted negotiation. Depending on the degree of hospital competition, the degree of unionization, geographical contexts and fiscal capacity, entities can negotiate higher wages in one region rather than another. An example is the special status premium for nurses in Gatineau (Quebec) during the 2007-2011 period (Le Droit, 2011) because this city shares its border with Ottawa (Ontario), which facilitates labour mobility and increases competition. Nonetheless, one might technically argue the fact that collective bargaining is realized at the provincial level limits the variability of the observations in the six derived provinces. To circumvent this potential issue, we applied the bootstrapping technique to produce robust standard errors.
Distribution function of average hourly wage (dependent variable)
The curve for RNs average hourly wages (from the Stata Kernel distribution) reveals that the distribution is far from normal. In fact, the data show a strong positive asymmetry.
Consequently, the dependent variable must be transformed to have a robust model specification and reliable parameter estimates. A logarithmic transformation formula was used (see Appendix A for details).
Formal presentation of the empirical model
In the LFS sample design, the regions are first selected and then respondents within these regions are selected. In such cases, these respondents (nurses in our case) interact with the social contexts to which they belong; this means they are influenced by these contexts / regions, which in turn are influenced by these employees. Thus, the individual observations are not completely independent, as required by the OLS estimation method. 19 The average intra-region correlation between the variables will tend to be higher than the average inter-region correlation and the standard deviations will be too low; which will lead to significant, but spurious results. Multilevel (or hierarchical) modeling is well suited for variables defined at different levels (individual and group). It is more robust than the two-step estimation procedure used by some authors (such as Schumacher 1995, 2005) because by combining the levels, the multi-level model (MLM) prevents analysis and interpretation of variables at non-appropriate levels (Hox, 2010; Hox and Roberts, 2011) .
The intercept-only model
A preliminary step of the MLM is to determine how the wage variance is spread over different levels. For this, we begin with the simplest model: the "intercept only model" (M0). It does not include any explanatory variables and is equivalent to an analysis of variance with random effects. Therefore, it is an unconditional model that cannot explain RN wages.
At level 1:
Where:
ln S ij is the natural logarithm of hourly wage for nurse i in region j (j = 1, …, 54).
0 is the intercept. This means each region has a different intercept; which represents a major difference from usual regression models.
represents a random error term associated with nurse i in region j. We assume ~ (0, 2 ) , i.e. is normally distributed with zero mean and 2 which is the variance associated with the lowest-level errors (to be determined for each region).
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At level 2: 0 = 00 + 0 (2) By substituting (2) into (1), we get the single equation:
00 represents the mean of hourly wage (the fixed part of the model);
0 is a random error term associated with each region j. By hypothesis, 0 is normally distributed with zero mean and 0 2 which is the variance associated with the highest-level errors;
We assume 0 ~ (0, 0 2 ) . These error terms and 0 represent the stochastic part of the model and are independent components. This intercept-only model of equation (3) In the presence of hierarchical data, the standard errors of the fixed coefficients from the OLS model are biased downward. The higher the ρ value, the greater the bias is. For a ρ value greater than 5%, it is generally recommended to use the multilevel models, especially when one is interested in the variance components (Bressoux, 2010 ).
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To demonstrate whether it is appropriate to use the multilevel model, we use the LFS data and found that 10.1% of the variance of the average wage for RNs is explained at the region level; which is high enough to use the multilevel model (see Table B in Appendix B for details).
The variables at the individual level
In the first stage of the MLM, it is necessary to introduce variables at the individual level only in order to be able to explain RN wage differences within a region. Therefore, employees represent the unit of analysis in this smaller level. The equation for this model (M1) takes the following form:
Where ln S ij , 0 and are defined as in 3.2.1 in the intercept-only model.
X ij includes variables related to the individual characteristics of RN i belonging to region j. These variables affect RN wages and have β kj coefficients (slopes associated with each first-level explanatory variable k; i.e. k = 1, ..., n, where (n) is the number of first level explanatory variables). It is assumed that these coefficients are different for each region, unlike the usual regression models. In this model, these variables at the individual level, also known as global variables (X i ) include: number of years of experience and its square, 22 tenure, employment status (full time versus part-time). 23 We also include province and union status at this first level.
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Using the names of the first level variables, we obtain:
These variables were previously defined. It should be added:
Empl_status is an auxiliary variable equal to 1 for full-time employment and 0 otherwise; i.e.
RNs working part-time is the reference group.
22 Wage can be a nonlinear function of the number of years of experience; hence we have also included the square of years of experience. 23 Note that mobility of nurses cannot be taken into account because we do not have longitudinal data in the LFS. 24 In principle, all variables that vary between regions and labour markets are excluded in the first step. However, we cannot add too many variables in the second step. So there is a trade-off.
Union is an auxiliary variable equal to 1 for unionized RNs and 0 otherwise; i.e. non-unionized RNs is the reference group.
Prov is a categorical variable (equal to 1 for Ontario, 2 for the Atlantic Provinces, 3 for Quebec, 4 for MB & SK, 5 for Alberta and 6 for BC).
The coefficients associated with education level, years of experience, tenure and union coverage
(among the γ 10 ) should be positive: hourly wages should increase with the level of education, with the number of years of experience, with tenure and with the fact of being covered by a union. Moreover, wages are expected to be higher in Alberta and lower in Quebec relative to Ontario.
The variables at the regional or contextual level
The second stage in this hierarchical model is to explain variation in the regression coefficients β 0j and β kj by introducing regional or contextual variables. In other words, we examine whether the wage differences between RNs estimated in the first stage (the β kj ) change systematically according to the characteristics of the markets or regions (i.e. we introduce variables that change between regions but not within the region being the reference size to omit.
The first subscript in the gammas represents the order of the variable at level 1 and the second indicates the order of the variable at level 2. The HI is the cornerstone of the study. Thus, if only one variable needs to be introduced at level 2, the HI is the natural candidate.
However, market size is also included as a variable in the second level because wages are expected to increase with market size. This could be explained by the monopsony theory and/or higher cost of living in urban areas. Consequently, we include both the HI and market size as second level variables for testing the monopsony model.
By hypothesis, in equations (6) and (7), the regression coefficients (gamma) do not vary between regions. Therefore, they do not carry any j index indicating to which region they belong. Being applied to all regions, they are designated as fixed coefficients. Any inter-region variation that still exists in these coefficients after they were estimated with the contextual variables is interpreted as the variation of the error terms. Therefore, the gammas are the fixed part of the model. u 0j and u kj are the random errors at the contextual level. They are specific to each region, with variance 0 2 2 respectively. The covariance between u 0j and u kj is 0 for k ≠ 0. It is generally assumed to be non-zero.
It is expected that the coefficient γ 01 for the Herfindahl index to be negative: a high index (monopsony indicator) will produce a low hourly wage for RNs. The coefficient γ 02 for Size should be positive: large (urban) market will pay higher hourly wage for RNs.
The main effect multi-level model
Equations (6) and (7) can be included in equation (5) This equation suggests, from the interaction terms 1 and 2 that the relationship between hourly wages and the individual variables depends on the level of market share and market size.
V. Results and interpretation
We reproduce in the last column of are also provided. Results for M3 are discussed below. As previously mentioned, the bootstrapping technique was applied to produce robust standard errors. 25 Some estimates that were significant without the bootstrapping become non-significant or marginally significant with the bootstrapping.
The coefficients are estimated with a high degree of precision. The Wald test generated a chisquared value of 2,145 as well as the associated p-value. This permits us to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero. Based on the p-value (Prob. > chi-squared = 0.000), we are able to reject the null hypothesis, meaning that including these variables create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model.
The coefficient for the main independent variable (HI) has large standard error (twice the value of the coefficient) and p-value of 0.60; therefore, it is not significant. The monopsony model predicts that this coefficient should be negative and increasing; that is, the lowest wage rate when hospital market share is high and increasing wage as market share decreases. Putting in another way, the model predicts lowest wage rate in markets with low level of competition and increasing wage as level of competition increases. 26 Thus, based on market share, our finding suggests there is no monopsony in the RN labour market.
The monopsony model also leads to the prediction that the coefficient on market size should be positive and increasing; that is, the lowest wage rates in the non-urban markets and increasing wages as market size increases. The coefficients for market size (regions) were not significant 25 Random sampling with 50 replications based on 54 clusters was performed for M2, M3 and M4. 26 Putting this way, the model predicts a positive relation between wage rate and level of competition.
either (p-value of 0.52). Therefore, based on market size, we found no support either for the monopsony in the RN labour market.
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The deviance decreases significantly when we introduce the level 1 predictors, and very slightly with the level 2 predictors. It declines a bit more with the random coefficient model (M3).
However, the deviance increases in the subsequent model with cross-level interaction (M4, see Table C in appendix C), which leads to conclude that M3 offers a better fit than any other model.
Given our hypothesis that unionisation counteracts employer concentration, it is natural to add the interaction term HI x union in the model. However, because HI is not significant, adding this interaction penalizes the model and did not produce the best fit.
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The intercept of 2.98 could be interpreted as a baseline for RN hourly wage. The fitted hourly wage is obtained by reversing the logarithmic function (See Appendix A); which gives a baseline wage of $19.70 per hour (e 2.98 ).
An analysis of the coefficients of the control variables provide some additional insights. Looking at the first level variables, the coefficient for education is positive and significant: RNs with a Bachelor degree earns 6.0% more per hour than those with a community college or CEGEP.
Likewise, the coefficient associated with years of experience is positive and significant: For each year of experience, hourly wage increased by 1.5%. But, this variable is entered as a quadratic one, meaning that the effect is non-linear and depends on what level of experience the RN has.
Squared years of experience is negative (the expected sign) and also significant. Its coefficient 27 The variable unemployment rate was tested in an alternative model and was also not significant (not shown in this paper). 28 The REML (restricted multi-level) models produce about the same results as the FML. However, the deviance is lower in the FML. Results from the REML are available upon request. 29 It should be noted that in the random part, there is no difference between the asymptotic estimate for the 2 nd level variable and the final bias-corrected (bootstrap) estimate (0.0108). It is as an indication that there is no bias in the second-level variance estimate.
suggests that wages for RNs are maximized after 25 years of experience.
30 Likewise, the coefficient for union status is positive and significant: unionized RNs earned 18.4% more per hour than those who are non-unionized. This confirms our hypothesis of a positive correlation between hourly wage and level of education, experience, being unionised.
Besides, even though the coefficient for tenure is weak, it is still positive and significant, as expected. Coefficient for employment status is negative: hourly wage for RNs who works fulltime was 1.3% less than for those who work part-time. However, the coefficient is marginally significant when bootstrapping is applied (p < 0.08). Notwithstanding, it has the expected sign, in line with Zeytinoglu et al. (2006) who report that part-time nurses received no benefits, but had an additional adjustment in their hourly wage.
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The family status seems to matter to some extent. RNs with no spouse/no kid earn 4.6% less per hour than those with spouse/kid(s), with p < 0.05. The coefficients also show an upward gradient: no spouse/no kids, spouse/no kids, spouse/kids and no spouse/kids. Nonetheless, there was only a marginal statistical significance in hourly wage between RNs with spouse/kid(s) and those with spouse/no kid(s) or those with no spouse/kid(s). These results suggest that RNs with no spouse/no kid(s) tend to earn less than those from any other family status.
The regression results suggest also that some differences exist between provinces. RNs in AC and Quebec were paid respectively 9.7% and 19.8% less per hour than those in Ontario.
However, the coefficient for AC was marginally significant while that for Quebec was strongly *: Significant at the 5% level.
+: The deviance is a measure of the model misfit. It is given by the formula -2*LogLikelihood. In general, models with a lower deviance fit better than models with a higher deviance. FS = Family status; S&K = Spouse and kid.
VI. General Discussion and Study Limitations
General Discussion
As discussed in the introduction, recent studies do not tend to support the monopsony model in nurse labour market (Adamache and Sloan, 1982; Schumacher 1995, 2005) .
Consequently, the finding of this current study is in line with recent empirical advances in monopsony models of nurses' labour market.
It should be noted that there is another approach to test for monopsony market. It seeks to explicitly estimate the elasticity or the inverse elasticity of labour supply in a given hospital. It uses an index based on prices or wages, as the Lerner index. The latter considers the difference between wages and marginal cost as a measure of the degree of monopsony. In fact, in a competitive market, the wage equals the marginal cost while a monopsony employer equalizes the marginal revenue product to the marginal cost. Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) an exogenous change in nurse wages at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. They found evidence for the monopsony model. However, this may be due to the fact that VA hospitals are highly differentiated workplaces. This elasticity-based approach is not used in this current study.
Some differences were found for RN wage rates for some provinces. It should be noted that this does not account for differences in cost of living (COL) between provinces. Quebec generally has a lower COL than the rest of Canada. For example, an approximation by Kozhaya (2006) Kozhaya (2006, p. 2) .
Similarly, information from Economic Development Winnipeg (2015) shows that basic household costs were lower in Quebec than in any other province. 33 If the COL were accounted for, the hourly wage gap of Quebec RNs relative to Ontario would drop. However, this dimension is out of scope of this study.
The finding suggest that RNs with no spouse/with kids earns relatively the highest hourly wage.
These nurses may have an incentive to take on higher paid or more challenging jobs (such as jobs in operating rooms or intensive care units) since being the only provider, they have to make more money to care for their family. This finding aligns somewhat with Zeytinoglu et al. (2006) who report that nurses are less inclined to leave the profession as the importance of their earnings for the family increases.
Study Limitations
Nurse wages are from survey data and not from administrative data; which could raise question about reliability and sampling error. To reduce potential bias due to small sample size, we have pooled the data, using three-year data. Moreover, triangulation of RN wages from the LFS with data from the Census and Canadian Federation of Nurses Union shows a large degree of 33 Basic household costs in Manitoba were the second or third lowest, depending on the family structure.
compatibility (Ariste and Béjaoui, 2015) . Therefore, the fact that these results are based on selfreported wages is not a concern.
Another possible limitation is that the MLM might not be the best empirical model for these data. The intra-class correlation was not substantially high (10.1%) while the threshold to use the MLM is > 5%). 34 Besides, with the high unionisation rate in nursing labour market in the public sector, wage variation tends to be limited. We have attempted to address this issue by bootstrapping the estimates.
VII. Conclusion
The use of monopsony power in nursing labour markets is appealing to explain reported shortages of RNs, particularly in Canada where collective bargaining is done through provincial health ministries. This study uses the confidential microdata file from Statistics Canada LFS and data from administrative sources (the CMDB managed by CIHI) in order to examine the relation between RNs hourly wages and hospital market share. The LFS data were pooled for the period 2010-2012 to have meaningful sample size in each region. Market shares were constructed based on the number of beds in a given hospital and region. Labour markets were defined according to nurse employment location in one of the 54 regions. These regions were regrouped into six peerregions (market sizes), based on the number of their workforce. Multilevel analysis was applied to properly distinguish control variables at the individual level and institutional level. We found no support for the monopsony theory, whether with respect to market share or market size.
Contrary to predictions of this theory which stipulates that RNs wages should 1) decline as market share increases and 2) increase with labour market size, our findings for Canada suggest that RNs wages are not related either to market share or market size. They are in line with previous studies that tested directly RNs wages and employment outcomes (Adamache and Sloan, 1982; Schumacher, 1995, 2005) . Some other studies have found evidence of monopsony in nurse labour market, mostly for the US. However, they either did not account for union presence (Hurd, 1973) or use an upward sloping labour supply curve as evidence of monopsony (Staiger et al, 2010) ; which is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Our finding suggests that the periodically perceived shortage in nursing labour market cannot be explained by the presence of monopsony. Even though a relatively large literature on the effect of monopsony power on wages in the nursing labour market exists, such studies are scant in
Canada. Further studies are needed to test for other implications from the monopsony model, such as elasticity estimate of the labour supply for Canadian nurses.
Appendices Appendix A: Transformation function for hourly wage
The distribution function for average hourly wages for RN (from the Stata Kernel distribution) reveals that the distribution is far from normal. In fact, the data show a strong positive asymmetry.
A.1. Choice of the transformation function
The dependent variable must be transformed to correct the skewness and have a robust model specification and reliable parameter estimates. The Box-Cox procedure (Neter et al, 1996) automatically identifies a form from the family of the power transformation as follows:
and Y' = ln(Y)
Where: λ is a parameter to be determined from the data. The best transformation is found using the Stata command (qladder salaire). The best approximation function is the one that follows closely a unit slope line; in this case the logarithmic function
Transformed Wage = ln(Wage)
Besides, natural logarithm (base e) 35 transformation is often used in empirical studies (OECD, 2008) .
A residual analysis (predict resid in Stata) was used to assess the model relevance via analysis of variance (ANOVA). From the distribution function of all residues (kdensity resid -Kernel density), the normality of the error terms has been verified; which means that the problem of asymmetry (skewness) is much less pronounced.
A.2. Re-transformation of hourly wage to the original scale
During a transformation from the logarithmic scale (where the distribution is normal) to the original scale of a log-normal distribution, an adjustment is necessary in order to preserve the mean. Thus, the estimated wage is obtained by inverting the logarithmic transformation of wages using the following formula (Neter et al, 1996) :
Where: ̂ is the estimated wage; is the power function; lnŜ is the estimated logarithm of wage and 2 is half the mean of the square error (the adjustment 1 2 ⁄ 2 is needed to ensure the transformation preserve the mean).
With this transformation, the interpretation of the results becomes more challenging. We are in the presence of a semi-log specification and the standard interpretation of the regression coefficients does not apply. These coefficients rather represent changes in percentage of wage following a one unit increase of the independent variables.
Appendix B: Relevance of using the multi-level model
To determine whether it is appropriate to use the multilevel model, we applied the intercept-only model on the RN data and found the following estimates. Performing gradient-based optimization:
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -2294.1052
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -2294.1052
Computing standard errors:
Mixed-effects ML regression Number of obs = 18,368
Group variable: uirtab Number of groups = 54
Wald chi2(0) = .
Log likelihood = -2294.1052 Prob > chi2 = .
- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
_cons | 3.485714 .0124921 279.03 0.000 3.46123 3.510198 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
